Proposed Citizens Right to Standing Act-Finding the Keys To Unlock the Courthouse Doors by Wood, Jr., Harold W.
Proposed Citizens Right To Standing Act-Finding
The Keys To Unlock The Courthouse Doors
Recent Supreme Court decisions severely restrict the right of
citizens to litigate in federal courts.' The Court's standing re-
quirements not only limit the ability of citizens to successfully
invoke federal court jurisdiction, but also confuse lower courts
and litigants attempting to apply the requirements.2 The restric-
tive standing requirements have met with increasing criticism, 3
and Congress is now considering legislative modification of stand-
ing doctrine.' Unfortunately, the Court's employment of constitu-
tional foundations in establishing current standing requirements
imposes substantial roadblocks Congress must avoid to enact
remedial standing legislation. This comment examines the con-
stitutional and pragmatic difficulties of statutory modification of
standing requirements and recommends an approach to remedial
legislation. After comparing recent proposals for standing legisla-
tion, this comment concludes that positive and comprehensive
legislation is needed for citizens and taxpayers to adequately
challenge unlawful government action in federal courts.
1. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservist Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614 (1973). See text accompanying notes 13-18 infra.
2. The Court's goal apparently was reduction of the federal courts' workload, but
ironically the requirements inflate time expended on threshold issues in cases that reach
the merits, thus failing to perform this function. See note 33 infra.
3. See Broderick, The Warth Optional Standing Doctrine: Return to Judicial
Supremacy?, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 467 (1976); Davis, Standing, 1976, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 69
(1977); Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELLL. REV.
663 (1977); Wolff, Standing to Sue: Capricious Application of Direct Injury Standard, 20
ST. Louis U.L.J. 663 (1976); Note, The Causal Nexus: What Must be Shown for Standing
to Sue in Federal Courts, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 250 (1977); 26 DRAKE L. REV. 728 (1977). A
few commentators approve the Supreme Court's position. See Leedes, Mr. Justice Pow-
ell's Standing, 11 U. RICH. L. REV. 269 (1977); Comment, Form and Function: Federal
Standing Since Warth v. Seldin, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 183 (1978).
4. The Chairmen of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees introduced the
Citizens Right to Standing in Federal Courts Act in the 95th Congress. See S. 3005, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S6498 (daily ed. April 27, 1978) (introduced by Senators
Metzenbaum, Kennedy, and Ribicoff); H.R. 13434, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC.
S6585 (daily ed. July 12, 1978) (introduced by Rep. Kastenmeier). In the 96th Congress,
Senator Metzenbaum reintroduced his bill essentially intact save for an additional provi-
sion eliminating the zone of interests standing principle. S. 680, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125
CONG. REC. S2822 (daily ed. March 15, 1979). See also H.R. 1047, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
125 CONG. REC. H187 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979) (introduced by Reps. Kastenmeier, Harris,
and Railsback) (identical to predecessor bill H.R. 13434).
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I. BACKGROUND
Standing doctrine determines whether plaintiffs have a right
to present a case. 5 Although theoretically the right to appear in
court is an issue in all suits, as a practical matter problems with
standing occur only when plaintiffs assert public causes of action.
Standing issues commonly occur when citizens challenge admin-
istrative agency action, challenge the constitutionality of a stat-
ute, challenge federal expenditures as taxpayers, or attempt en-
forcement of a regulatory statute.'
The doctrine of standing to sue, especially in federal courts,
once imposed severe restrictions on litigation, then underwent a
period of modern liberalization, and most recently has again
posed a barrier to judicial access. Early federal standing law re-
quired a plaintiff to allege that government action invaded a legal
right. This restrictive test denied standing to a person alleging
injury resulting from government action "unless the right in-
vaded was a legal right,-one of property, one arising out of con-
tract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on
a statute which confers a privilege." 7 In 1970, the Supreme Court
rejected this legal right test in the landmark case of Association
of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp.' Data
Processing established a two-pronged test for standing to chal-
lenge administrative agency action: a constitutional requirement
of "injury in fact"9 and a nonconstitutional requirement that the
5. In private lawsuits, standing is subsumed by doctrines such as "real party in
interest" or limitation of implied causes of action, which serve to control access to the
courts. Further, in the private context, the plaintiff establishes a stake in the controversy
by proving the elements of a cause of action, as when a plaintiff claims physical injury in
a tort action or economic injury by breach of contract. In litigation involving allegations
of illegal government activity, however, courts address the standing question as a separate
threshold inquiry. While in practice the standing inquiry is not always entirely a threshold
question, see note 22 infra, in essence "[tihe fundamental aspect of standing is that it
focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the
issues he wishes to have adjudicated." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (emphasis
added).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (challenging the consti-
tutionality of a statute); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (challenging adminis-
trative action); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (challenging federal expendi-
tures as a taxpayer); Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81
(2d Cir. 1972) (attempting injunctive enforcement of statute).
7. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939).
8. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). As in most challenges of governmental activity, the plaintiffs
invoked the judicial review provision of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1976).
9. The Court mentioned that beyond economic injury, it would consider injury to
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litigant's interest be "arguably within the zone of interests" of the
substantive statute, if any, forming the basis of the action.', This
two-pronged test became the universal standard permitting an
increasing number of litigants to challenge unlawful government
actions by invoking federal court jurisdiction."
Although commentators and litigants praised the liberalized
law of standing, ,2 the Court retained the relative simplicity of the
Data Processing test only briefly. The doors to the courthouse
began to swing closed again when the Court began to find new
grounds to deny standing, notwithstanding the presence of an
injury. First, in Linda R. S. v. Richard D., ' 3 the Court denied
standing for lack of sufficient causation between an alleged injury
and the challenged government action." Then, in United States
v. Richardson'" and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop
the War, 11 the Court denied standing because plaintiffs' com-
plaints were generalized grievances common to all members of
the public. Third, in Warth v. Seldin,'7 the Court developed a
requirement demanding a substantial probability that judicial
relief would directly provide the plaintiffs' desired remedy.'"
These three tests have been the focus of recent proposals for legis-
aesthetic, conservational, or recreational interests, or to spiritual interests in first amend-
ment values of freedom of religion. 397 U.S. at 154.
10. The Court's subsequent elaboration of the Data Processing standing tests focused
on the injury in fact test; the zone of interests requirement rarely posed standing problems
for litigants. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 n.19
(1976); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 n.5 (1972). Recent cases in the lower
federal courts, however, show a tendency to resurrect the zone of interests requirement.
See, e.g., Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (domestic oil producer not in zone of interests to object to
Internal Revenue Code provision giving tax credit to foreign producers); Clinton Com-
munity Hosp. Corp. v. Southern Md. Medical Center, 374 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1974),
aff'd, 510 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1048 (1975) (competitor hospital not
in zone of interests of Noise Pollution Control Act).
11. Subsequent interpretations of the injury in fact requirement were so broad that
allegations of future injury to plaintiffs' aesthetic and recreational interests, resulting
indirectly from government actions, satisfied the standing test. United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973). Although
SCRAP was the high water mark in the modern liberalization of standing, subsequent
cases rejected SCRAP's acceptance of injuries which were not both direct and substantial.
See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
12. See, e.g., Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450 (1970).
13. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
14. Id. at 617-18.
15. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
16. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
17. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
18. Id. at 499.
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lative correction. '9
II. CONSTITUTIONAL VS. PRUDENTIAL DERIVATION OF STANDING
RULES
Congressional power to modify standing requirements de-
pends on whether the standing doctrine in question is constitu-
tionally, or merely prudentially, grounded. The Supreme Court
frequently has stated that Congress may create a statutory right
conferring standing, subject only to article III limitations.2" Un-
fortunately, evolving conceptions of standing fail to differentiate
clearly between constitutional and "prudential" requirements.
This ambiguity makes the assessment of Congress's power to
enact corrective legislation difficult.
In federal courts, the standing concept has two distinct ele-
ments, one constitutionally derived and the second judicially cre-
ated. The "case" or "controversy" clause of the United States
Constitution2 supports an indefeasible requirement. The second
aspect of standing involves prudential rules. The Court has devel-
oped these nonconstitutional requirements as rules of self-
restraint. 2 The distinction between the two sources of standing
19. See note 4 supra.
20. "The actual or threatened injury required by Art. I may exist solely by virtue
of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing' . . . . Con-
gress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by
prudential standing rules." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975) (quoting Linda
R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)).
21. "The judicial Power of the United States shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties...
to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party .... U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1.
22.
Apart from [the] minimum constitutional mandate, this Court has recog-
nized other limits on the class of persons who may invoke the courts' decisional
and remedial powers. . . . Without such limitations-closely related to Art. III
concerns but essentially matters of judicial self-governance-the courts would
be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even
though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the
questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect
individual rights.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975).
Among the prudential limitations the Court has formulated are: whether causation
of the injury complained of is too attenuated, see Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614
(1973), whether the grievance is too generalized, see Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 208 (1974),
whether an appropriate remedy can be fashioned, see Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), whether the plaintiff may justifiably assert rights of third
parties, see Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943), whether the plaintiff claims interest
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doctrine is important because Congress can modify prudential,
but not constitutional, requirements .23
The Supreme Court articulated its rationale for constitu-
tional standing requirements in Flast v. Cohen.24 The Court iden-
tified three criteria for the article III limitation on standing: con-
creteness, adverseness, and adequacy of representation. 5 To as-
merely as a taxpayer, see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923), and whether the plaintiff's injury is in the zone of interests of a particular
statute, see Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
Many of these prudential concerns involve a cursory consideration of the merits.
Questions of causation, generalized grievance, redressability, and zone of interests all
require inquiry into the substance of the claim. Only questions of third parties and tax-
payer standing directly raise the issue of the appropriateness of the plaintiff to be a party.
In a strict sense, however, authentic standing issues, whether constitutional or prudential,
involve only the question of whether the plaintiff is an appropriate person to maintain the
lawsuit. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968), quoted at note 5 supra. Permitting
the standing inquiry to examine the merits rather than the parties leads to abuse by using
standing as a substitute for a decision on the merits. Critics accuse the Court of using
prudential standing rules to defeat claims of which it disapproves when precedent sup-
ports the merits of the claim. See Davis, supra note 3; Tushnet, supra note 3.
Another criticism of these prudential standing rules seems even more appropriate
today than when it was first made: "The law of standing as developed by the Supreme
Court has become an area of incredible complexity. Much that the Court has written
appears to have been designed to supply retrospective satisfaction rather than future
guidance." Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
23. "Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would
be barred by prudential standing rules. Of course, Art. III's requirement remains .
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
24. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Prior to Flast, federal taxpayers lacked standing to challenge
any governmental spending program because courts not only required litigants to show
the challenged spending program was unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, but also that
the program caused a direct injury to the plaintiff. The direct injury test permitted
taxpayers to challenge IRS rulings affecting their personal tax status, but denied standing
where the injury was suffered "in some indefinite way in common with people generally."
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). The Court ended debate on whether the
direct injury standard was constitutional or prudential by recognizing it explicitly as a
rule of self-restraint, then discarding it in favor of a standard requiring a logical nexus
between the status of the plaintiff and the claim to permit adjudication. Thus, the
"taxpayer must show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limi-
tations upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power and not simply
that the enactment is generally beyond the power delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8."
392 U.S. at 102-03. This creates only a very limited exception to the general denial of
taxpayer standing. Today, the Burger Court appears to be hearkening back to the anti-
quated rationale of Frothingham. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
25. "[I1n terms of the Article III limitation on federal court jurisdiction, the question
of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be pre-
sented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial
resolution." 392 U.S. at 101. Compare the remark by Professor Davis: "The purpose of
the law of standing is to determine who is justly entitled to use the judicial machinery,
not to sharpen the presentation of issues for the benefit of the judiciary." Davis, supra
note 3, at 81.
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sure the adequate presentation of issues in an adversary context,
the Court has held that constitutional standing requires a"personal stake""6 or an "injury in fact.", 7
By contrast, the prudential requirements are founded on
principles of judicial self-restraint. 8 The Court, however, has not
distinguished the differing rationales for prudential and constitu-
tional standing. 9 This confusion between prudential and consti-
26. Relying on identical language from an earlier case, the Court in Flast concluded,
without revealing its reasoning, that adjudication of issues "historically viewed as capable
of judicial resolution" required litigants to have a "personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy." 392 U.S. at 101 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). Professor
Raoul Berger believes that the Court's imposition of a constitutionally mandated require-
ment of a personal stake is historically unjustified. He argues that the case or controversy
requirement of article II presupposes the historical context of the courts of Westminster
when the Constitution was framed. History discloses that litigants without a personal
stake were permitted to challenge jurisdictional usurpations in the English courts on
behalf of the public interest. Thus, a personal stake limitation on standing cannot rest
on historically derived constitutional compulsions. Berger, Standing to Sue in Public
Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969).
27. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
28. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975), quoted at note 22 supra.
Because prudential rules are motivated by concerns for judicial self-restraint, they need
not be immutably applied. The Court has enumerated several countervailing considera-
tions where other values will outweigh its reluctance to exert judicial power:
For example, where, as a result of the very litigation in question, the constitu-
tional rights of one not a party would be impaired, and where he has no effective
way to preserve them himself, the Court may consider those rights as before it.
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459-460 [1958]; Barrows v. Jackson,
[346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953)] . . . . This Court has indicated that where the
application of these rules would itself have an inhibitory effect on freedom of
speech, they may not be applied. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151,
* * * Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 . ...
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960) (parallel citations omitted). Accord, Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). Compare the remark by Professor Jaffe:
My own view has been and continues to be that a plaintiff who does not have a
"protected interest" whether as an individual or a group, does not have a right
to review, but that a court in its discretion may at the suit of such a person
review the legal question if it deems such consideration to be in the public
interest.
Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REv. 633, 634-35 (1971). But Professor Broderick
argues that courts should not be able to decide on an optional, ad hoc basis which cases
to decide merely on the basis of judicial economy: "[S]uch a practice raises 'equal
protection' aspects of the Fifth Amendment on which the Court would quickly 'pounce' if
other government agencies were so involved in such selectivity." Broderick, supra note 3,
at 525.
29. For example, the Court treated the generalized grievances limitation as a pruden-
tial bar in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), but apparently as a constitu-
tional barrier in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974),
where the Court stated:
All citizens, of course, share equally an interest in the independence of each
branch of Government. In some fashion, every provision of the Constitution was
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tutional considerations resulted in a blending of rationales in
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization.0 With-
out discussion, the Eastern Kentucky Court imposed a new con-
stitutional test for standing..The Court required constitutionally
not only injury in fact but also the formerly prudential elements
of causation and substantial likelihood that a favorable judicial
determination would redress the plaintiff's injury.'
By constitutionalizing standing barriers, the Court failed to
distinguish properly between prudential concerns and constitu-
tional restrictions. 32 The need for judicial self-restraint motivated
meant to serve the interests of all. Such a generalized interest, however, is too
abstract to constitute a "case or controversy" appropriate for judicial resolution.
Id. at 226-27 (footnote omitted).
The Court confused the two rationales further in Warth, stating: "[The standing]
inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and pruden-
tial limitations on its exercise. In both dimensions it is founded in concern about the
proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society." 422 U.S. at 498
(citation omitted). Such combination of the two aspects of standing is not uncommon. In
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), the Court also noted that rules of self-restraint
and constitutional limitations were not always clearly distinguished. Nevertheless, the
motives for each are conceptually distinct. Prudential concerns involve questions of judi-
cial self-restraint, while constitutional considerations require only an examination of the
parties to decide whether they are entitled to sue. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-
500 (1975), quoted at note 22 supra.
30. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
31. The Court held that a plaintiff must show "an injury to himself that is likely to
be redressed by a favorable decision" and that "[aibsent such a showing, exercise of its
power by a federal court would be gratuitous and thus inconsistent with the Art. I
limitation." Id. at 38.
32. By labeling standing barriers of generalized grievance, causation, and redress-
ability as constitutional the Court ignores their origins as prudential doctrines. Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan dissented in Eastern Kentucky, insisting that redressability was and should
remain a prudential consideration and that the Constitution requires only concrete ad-
verseness flowing from a personal stake in the outcome. He objected to reliance on the
irreducible article III minimum, fearing that such a rationale would deny Congress the
power to rectify an increasingly muddled and restrictive approach to standing. Brennan
insisted:
In our modern-day society, dominated by complex legislative programs and
large-scale governmental involvement in the everyday lives of all of us, judicial
review of administrative action is essential both for protection of individuals
illegally harmed by that action, . . . and to ensure that the attainment of
congressionally mandated goals is not frustrated by illegal action . ...
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 65 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring
in the judgment and dissenting) (citations omitted). Cf. Berger, supra note 26 (rejection
of personal stake test as constitutional limitation).
Despite such criticism, the majority of the Court shows no signs of reconsidering its
position. Recently, in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S.
59 (1978), the Court upheld standing for a citizen group, but nonetheless employed a two-
pronged test for constitutional standing: "injury in fact" and a "'substantial likeli-
hood' that the relief requested will redress the injury." Id. at 75 n.20. The Court expressly
rested these two criteria on the case and controversy requirement of article III.
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the development of prudential requirements. Paradoxically, how-
ever, complex standing rules promote only judicial diseconomy
by causing time delays and litigant confusion. 33 By contrast, the
Constitution historically permitted a court appearance by any
plaintiff presenting specific claims in an adversary context.3 4 Dis-
satisfied with restrictive standing barriers, Congress is consider-
ing legislative action aimed at reducing standing to this constitu-
tional minimum.
Although the constitutional basis for the two-pronged injury-in-fact requirement
seems clear, the Court referred to other, previously constitutional standing doctrines,
relating to generalized grievances and purported representation of the rights of third
parties, as prudential concerns. See notes 29 & 31 supra. In a sweeping summation, the
Court made a puzzling statement creating further ambiguity as to the constitutional or
prudential foundation of the new standing principles, stating: "Where a party champions
his own rights, and where the injury alleged is a concrete and particularized one which
will be prevented or redressed by the relief requested, the basic practical and prudential
concerns underlying the standing doctrine are generally satisfied when the constitutional
requisites are met." 438 U.S. at 80-81. The circuitous reasoning of this statement fails to
provide any guidance in determining the Court's view of which doctrines are prudential
and which are constitutional.
33. The imposition of restrictive standing requirements is an ineffective and ill-
advised attempt to promote judicial economy. A rigid application of causation and re-
dressability requires courts to spend excessive time analyzing the merits of a case for
standing purposes. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59
(1978), illustrates the hardship of complex standing rules on both courts and litigants. The
district court had to conduct a four-day trial on the issues of standing and ripeness alone
before reaching the merits. Carolina Environmental Study Group v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 203 (W.D.N.C. 1977). Before the case reached the Supreme Court,
a member of the House Judiciary Committee predicted that because of the new standing
doctrines the Court would decide the plaintiffs lacked standing. See State of the Judiciary
and Access to Justice, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and rhe
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 35
(1977) (remarks by Rep. Drinan during Ralph Nader's testimony). But on appeal the
Supreme Court upheld standing, despite defense efforts to dismiss the case on standing
grounds. The disparate results from application of the same standards creates uncertainty
and unpredictability for litigants, delays consideration of the merits in most cases, and
tends to preclude decisions entirely in cases where plaintiffs may actually deserve to
litigate their claims.
34. Indeed, plaintiffs willing to carry a case all the way to the Supreme Court have a
sufficient adversary interest to satisfy article III concerns, absent a clearly political ques-
tion. In fact, the Court has analyzed such problems in precisely such terms. In Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), the Court held that although the legal issue as to the representa-
tive plaintiff of a class action suit had become moot, the Court could reach the merits of
the claim because "the interests of [the] class have been competently urged at each level
of the proceeding." Id. at 403. A major criticism of the Supreme Court's recent standing
decisions, however, is properly founded on the fact that the Court often denied standing
on appeal after the merits had been thoroughly aired and judgment rendered on them in
the lower courts. Senator Metzenbaum's proposed Citizens Right to Standing in Federal
Courts Act removes this problem by providing that unless a plaintiffs lack of standing to
sue is raised prior to entry of judgment in the court of first impression, it may not be raised
on appeal except as required by article III. S. 3005, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC.
S6498 (daily ed. April 27, 1978).
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III. CONGRESSIONAL AUGMENTATION OF STANDING
Responding to the Supreme Court's restrictive approach to
standing, members of the House and Senate Judiciary Commit-
tees have proposed the "Citizens Right to Standing in Federal
Courts Act."35 The bill, introduced by Senator Howard Metzen-
baum and others, specifies in a negative, prohibitory fashion four
grounds the federal courts may not apply in dismissing an action
for lack of a plaintiff's standing. 3 The four prohibited grounds for
dismissal are: first, the injury complained of is a generalized
grievance; second, the defendant's conduct is not the primary
cause of the injury; third, a decision for the plaintiff on the merits
of the case is not substantially likely to remedy or redress the
injury the plaintiff suffered; or fourth, the plaintiff seeks to pro-
tect an interest not arguably within the zone of the interests
protected by the law in question. The bill's obvious purpose is to
declare the holdings of recent restrictive standing cases void.37
The congressional proposal creates several potential separa-
tion of powers problems, impacting both judicial independence
and, perhaps, the balance of powers. Any legislation modifying
standing doctrine reduces the power of courts to decide which
cases to hear. Such action clearly infringes on judicial independ-
ence. This infringement is a critical issue today because of the
Supreme Court's current emphasis on judicial self-restraint. 8 At
least one commentator believes that "judicial power expands as
the requirements of standing are relaxed. '3 This observation
questions whether judicial power may be excessively expanded,
thus upsetting the balance of coordinate branches of government.
Both the judicial independence and the balance of powers consid-
35. See note 4 supra.
36. The bill applies only to actions brought against the United States or any officer
or agency thereof, against any state or local governmental entity or officer, or against the
District of Columbia. S. 680, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 125 CONG. REC. S2822 (daily ed.
March 15, 1979).
37. In reintroducing the legislation in the 96th Congress, Senator Metzenbaum
pointed out that the first ground attacked the decision in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), the second addressed the causation concept of Linda
R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), the third involved the concept of redressability
articulated in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), and the
fourth addressed the zone of interest concept of Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 125 CONG. REC. S2821 (daily ed. March 15, 1979)
(remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum).
38. See generally, Abrahams & Mattis, The Duty To Decide us. The Daedalian
Doctrine of Abstention, 1 U. PUGET SD. L. REV. 1 (1977).
39. Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?-The School-Prayer Cases, 1963 Sup. CT.
REV. 1, 15.
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erations are relevant in analyzing the validity of any congres-
sional action modifying standing barriers.
The situation most analogous to congressional alteration of
standing requirements is congressional authority to adjust the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. While many cases and commen-
tators assert that Congress has extremely broad power to alter
federal court jurisdiction,"0 limitations exist, resting upon both
concern for the independence of the judiciary4 and due process
requirements .42
Whatever may be the due process limits to withdrawing ju-
risdiction and thereby preventing persons harmed by government
action from litigating their claims, such concerns are inapposite
where Congress seeks to expand rather than withdraw jurisdic-
tion. Nonetheless, the separation of powers concerns remain, al-
beit for a different reason. Most of the jurisdictional worries cen-
ter on the elimination of an independent judiciary as a check on
other branches of government. 3 By contrast, in the standing con-
text, the independence of the judiciary centers on judicial ability
40. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-02 (1973); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440, 448 (1850); Hart, The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic,
66 HARv. L. REv. 1362 (1953); Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L.
REv. 1001, 1005 (1965).
41. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) (Congress may not enact
legislation eliminating an area of jurisdiction in order to control results in particular case);
Hart, supra note 40, at 1365 (Congress may not constitutionally make exceptions to
jurisdiction of Supreme Court that would destroy its essential role in constitutional plan);
Rotunda, Congressional Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts
and the Problem of School Busing, 64 GEO. L.J. 839, 844-51 (1976) (independence of
judiciary as coordinate branch of government able to serve as check on other branches is
frustrated by any interstitial elimination of lower federal courts' jurisdiction).
42. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 120 (1946) (Constitution may require judi-
cial review); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907) (due process clause of
fourteenth amendment entitles taxpayer opportunity to contest to legality of state taxes
imposed); Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 527 (1974) (congressional power to enact jurisdictional laws
cannot include authorization to prevent any vindication of a constitutional right); Hart,
supra note 40, at 1365; Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction
of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45,
93 (1975) (congressional power to regulate jurisdiction of federal courts is limited by due
process clause of fifth amendment in cases where the doors of state courts are closed);
Rotunda, supra note 41, at 854 ("To prevent the legislature from using the federal courts
to accomplish unconstitutional ends, Congress' article III power must be subject to the
due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment."); Note, Congressional Power over State
and Federal Court Jurisdiction: The Hill-Burton and Trans-Alaska Pipeline Examples,
49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 131 (1974) (Pipeline Act's denial of any forum to litigate otherwise
justiciable claim may be invalid as deprivation of due process).
43. In standing, however, the issue is the reverse: whether expansion of judicial power
may upset the balance of powers. See Brown, supra note 39.
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to control court dockets. But, if the independence of the judiciary
is important, it is in its role as one of the tripartite branches of
government, as a balance to the majoritarian branches of govern-
ment and as the final arbiter of the Constitution." The independ-
ence of the judiciary is not a value in itself; it has meaning only
to promote the balance of powers. In our system of government,
the Congress retains a great deal of control over the jurisdiction
of the federal courts. The legislative branch makes the law as a
matter of substantive policy, and also may promulgate the rules
of procedure and evidence that the courts are bound to follow. In
fact, because the legislature may change an unwanted develop-
ment in decisional law," Congress may even prescribe rules of
analysis in judicial opinions." Rather than legislatively intruding
on the province of the courts, statutes prescribing rules of inter-
pretation prevent courts from usurping the legislature's functions
by misinterpreting legislative pronouncements of policy.,7
In fact standing is best understood as a procedural doctrine,
modifiable under Congress's power to prescribe rules of procedure
for the federal courts. 8 With standing thus understood, the fears
of unwarranted expansion of judicial power resulting from relaxed
standing requirements are themselves unwarranted." In the first
place, neither legislative nor judicial definitions of standing
modify jurisdictional requirements. Congress cannot alter justici-
ability requirements by authorizing judicial consideration of a
"political question" or advisory opinions. Standing, however,
addresses not what may be decided but who may bring a claim.M
Some of the Court's recent standing rules, such as generalized
44. See Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363 (1973).
45. See Stockdale v. Insurance Cos., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 323 (1873) (sustaining a
statutory admonition that a prior statute should not be construed in a specified way); H.
HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW 804-07 (tent. ed. 1958) (legislatures can state postulates which control reasoning
by courts).
46. A very few cases and commentators contradict this proposition. See United States
v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872) (Congress may not prescribe rules of decision in a
pending case); Roney v. Warwick, 172 Pa. 140, 33 A. 373 (1895) (statute specifying what
a phrase "shall be construed to mean" struck down as unconstitutional); Thomas,
Statutory Construction Where Legislation is Viewed as a Legal Institution, 3 HAxv. J.
LEGIS. 191, 211 n.85 (1965-66) (legislature violates separation of powers where a statute
seeks to control attitudes or subjective thoughts of judiciary). But see note 45 supra.
47. R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 270 (1978).
48. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONST'u-
TIONAL LAW 39 (1978).
49. See Brown, supra note 39.
50. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968), quoted at note 5 supra.
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grievances and causation, are criticized justifiably as going to the
merits of the claim, because they regulate "what" rather than
"who." Therefore, congressional authority to modify such stand-
ing requirements is recognizable under its powers both to regulate
procedure and to control substantive law.
Even though broadened standing would not create an inher-
ent increase in judicial power, it may have the practical effect of
expanding judicial power simply because the courts would resolve
more controversies. Such an effect, however, merely provides a
check on excessive regulatory bureaucracy and encourages a bal-
ance of judicial power concomitant with the phenomenal modern
growth of the legislative and administrative spheres of govern-
ment.5' Arguably, even outright jurisdictional expansion may be
justified. Congress apparently has already recognized a need for
greater judicial review by eliminating the amount in controversy
requirement in suits against the federal government.2
The foregoing considerations support congressional authority
to legislate standing rules consistent with separation of powers
concerns and illustrate that, absent other constitutional objec-
tions, the proposed Citizens Right to Standing in Federal Courts
Act is constitutionally valid. Unfortunately, recent constitution-
alization of formerly prudential standing doctrines poses just
such serious constitutional difficulties. As discussed earlier, the
Supreme Court now seems to treat causation, redressability, and
sometimes issues of generalized grievances as constitutional limi-
tations." Because the Court is the final and authoritative exposi-
tor of the Constitution, Congress may be without authority to
decide that the article III case or controversy requirement is satis-
fied without the fine spun refinements of injury in fact such as
causation and redressability. 4 Whether Congress could deter-
mine that an injury exists where the Court does not perceive one,
or whether it could reject the injury in fact requirement itself
presents the crucial question. 55 A simple congressional denial of
principles the Court has pronounced as constitutional would be
51. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1 (2d ed. 1978) (impor-
tance of seven federal regulatory agencies in the 1930's overshadowed by over 76 adminis-
trative agencies in the 1970's).
52. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1331(a) (Supp. 1979)).
53. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
54. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975), quoted at note 23 supra.
55. See generally D. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF
RESPONSIBILITY (1966); Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40




Nonetheless, assuming the Court will insist that injury in
fact, causation, and redressability are constitutional require-
ments, it is submitted that Congress still has the power to remove
the standing barriers imposed by the Court. Congress can modify
standing barriers and give citizens the right to challenge unlawful
government action in several ways: (1) remove prudential stand-
ing requirements; (2) create a substantive right the invasion of
which creates standing; (3) provide for judicial review in connec-
tion with substantive legislation; (4) provide for citizen suits
within substantive legislation; (5) create representational stand-
ing; and (6) create taxpayer standing. To determine which ap-
proach or combination of approaches should be employed, the
policy justifications and constitutional authority for each must be
examined.
A. Removal of Prudential Standing Barriers
The Metzenbaum proposal would eliminate at least two pru-
dential standing requirements relating to the generalized griev-
ances concept and the zone of interests test. One commentator
proposes the removal of all prudential standing requirements,
including limits on asserting the rights of third parties and the
ripeness requirement. 5 Although Professor Sedler bases the
power to remove the nonconstitutional aspects of standing on the
congressional article III power to regulate the jurisdiction of the
federal courts,57 a broader rationale rests on congressional power
to control substantive law within the constitutional framework.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized congressional
power to remove prudential requirements."'
Although purporting to remove a few prudential barriers, the
Metzenbaum proposal is singularly weak because it does not ad-
dress other nonprudential barriers and thereby fails to provide
clear guidelines for citizens challenging unlawful government ac-
tion. By specifying only grounds courts may not apply to bar
access to the federal courts, the proposed act fails to establish
what a plaintiff must allege to attain standing.59 Indeed, a plain-
56. Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposals for
Legislative Reform, 30 RuTGERs L. REV. 863, 878 (1977).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975), quoted at note 23 supra.
59. Pleading requirements for standing are sometimes reminiscent of long obsolete
technical requirements. The confusing and often inconsistent line of precedents makes it
difficult for litigants to determine what they must show to gain standing. The litigant also
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tiff could not use the proposed act in court except as a defense
against application of the proscribed standards. This approach
would be analogous to abolishing common law writs but failing
to substitute a permissible form of action. Mere negation will only
lead to more appellate review, leaving litigants in essentially the
same position of uncertainty. The Metzenbaum bill, therefore,
does not achieve its goal of clarifying the existing law of stand-ing. °The Sedler proposal, though including all prudential require-
ments, likewise fails to broaden the citizen's ability to challenge
unlawful government actions." Eliminating prudential require-
ments still leaves the new constitutional requirements intact,
thus failing to establish any procedure for assuring standing.,'
B. Creating a Substantive Right
Substantive legislation may create standing by establishing
a legal right which may be invaded. 3 Rather than attempting to
faces uncertainty in knowing whether a court will take an expansive or restrictive view of
standing requirements. As testimony in Congress has indicated,
what is needed is comprehensive standing legislation setting out precise stan-
dards under which citizens are assured access to the courts to protect their
rights. By incorporating meaningful and easy to apply standards, such legisla-
tion would eliminate the needless drain of the federal judiciary caused by the
Supreme Court's confusion of the law of standing.
State of the Judiciary and Access to Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1977) (statement of Ralph Nader).
60. In introducing H.R. 13434, the Metzenbaum standing proposal, Representative
Kastenmeier stated that "restrictive decisions on standing often result in a tremendous
waste of judicial resources while lower court judges are left to decipher confusing com-
mands from the higher courts. . . . [Tihe purpose of the proposed legislation is to ad-
dress and resolve growing confusion in the area of standing to bring suit." 124 CONG. REc.
E3733-34 (daily ed. July 13, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
61. A broader view of standing is consistent with contemporary advocacy of increased
citizen participation in government. Judicial review does not usurp democratic power, but
rather encourages the fundamental principles of representative government: "Citizen
participation is not simply a vehicle for minority protection, but a creative element in
government and lawmaking. The usual taxpayer and citizen suit is thoroughly consistent
with the primacy of majority rule." Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The
Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033, 1045 (1968).
62. Because of other grounds for denial, passage of this proposal, as currently framed,
would not assure standing. These include the law of taxpayer standing, United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208 (1974), retention of principles of mootness, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975),
ripeness, id., representation of third parties, id., and prosecutorial discretion, Linda R.
S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). See Department of Justice, Staff Memorandum on
the Impact of Standing Legislation, 124 CoNG. REc. S6499-501 (daily ed. April 27, 1978),
for an analysis of how the Act would influence these four decisions.
63. See note 20 supra.
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remove judicially established standing doctrine, this approach
simply legislatively creates a type of case or controversy for which
citizens are to have standing. The creation of this substantive
right would be based not upon Congress's power to regulate the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, but upon its power to create a
substantive claim. For example, Chief Justice Burger has called
upon Congress to create a statutory cause of action to vindicate
the rights of persons who have had their fourth amendment rights
violated by government officials." Professor Sedler recommends
an even broader aproach: creation of a substantive right to com-
pliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States on
the part of all government officials. 5 Congressional authority to
create a substantive right in this context arises from the"necessary .and proper" clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.66 Just as Congress may enact civil rights laws or regulate
interstate commerce under constitutional authority, Congress
can make a legislative finding that a citizen right of action is
necessary to enforce the laws of the United States. In effect, such
a determination entails congressional recognition that citizens
suffer injury in fact whenever Congress, the President, executive
officials, or administrative agency personnel violate the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States, thus translating an abstract
injury into a specific one. The new substantive claim does sound
suspiciously akin to Congress declaring that a litigant need not
possess the requisite judicially redressable injury in fact which
the Court has stated is a constitutional requirement." But if the
Court applies a test of presumption of constitutionality, which it
64. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
422-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
65. Professor Sedler recommends a statute in these terms:
All citizens and residents of the United States have a substantive right to com-
pliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States on the part of the
Congress, the President, executive officials, and administrative agencies. Any
citizen or resident may maintain an action in the courts of the United States
against the United States or against the appropriate officer thereof, challenging
the constitutionality of any Act of Congress, or challenging any action of the
President, any Member of Congress, any executive official, or any administra-
tive agency as violating the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Sedler, supra note 56, at 879.
66. The Constitution gives Congress the power to "make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. A
congressional decision to create a right of action to enforce the Constitution and the laws
of the United States is well-founded upon this power.
67. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976), quoted at
note 31 supra.
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ordinarily does in deference to congressional fact-finding, the
Court might interpret this kind of statutory cause of action as
merely identifying the requisite injury, legislatively creating a
type of case or controversy. Numerous statements by the Court
8
indicate that this approach should, and probably would, be up-
held as constitutional, because it does not reverse any constitu-
tional principle, realign the judiciary vis-a-vis Congress, or give
the judiciary more jurisdiction or power. The approach sinrply
creates a legal right that courts are accustomed to enforcing.
C. Judicial Review Statutes
Congress can also augment standing procedurally by provid-
ing for judicial review." For example, the Administrative Proce-
dure Act 70 (APA) provides for judicial review.7' The Court, how-
ever, has stated that under this provision the Constitution re-
quires not only injury in fact, 7 but also redressability. 3 These
requirements reflect the APA formulation bestowing standing
only on parties "aggrieved" or "adversely affected. ' 74 Although
the APA and similar judicial review provisions do not automati-
cally confer standing, a more broadly worded judicial review pro-
vision might do so. In fact, existing legislation already has re-
sulted in judicial recognition of congressional power to augment
standing despite limiting requirements for injury in fact, causa-
tion, and redressability.15 A broader judicial review provision con-
fers standing by authorizing review and explicitly identifying who
may be a suitable plaintiff.
76
68. See, e.g., notes 20 & 23 supra.
69. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (standing
approved because statute gave right of action to "[a]ny person who claims to have been
injured." 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1970)).
70. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
71. "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof." Id. § 702.
72. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
73. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
74. See also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 n.2 (1974) ("party injured" formu-
lation of Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) held to not bestow standing in
absence of showing that invasion of statutory right has occurred or is likely to occur).
75. See examples cited in notes 20 & 69 supra.
76. "[Wlhere the suit is otherwise justiciable, the question whether the litigant is a
'proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue', Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 109 (1968), . . . is one within the power of Congress to determine." Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972). Undeniably, Congress may not confer jurisdiction
to render advisory opinions, to entertain collusive suits, or to resolve political questions,
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The rationale for judicial review statutes rests upon the
policy of providing review of delegated authority given to admin-
istrative agencies." Arguably, without such review, there would
be a denial of due process.78 Congress undoubtedly has the power
to say who may invoke judicial review, but this must be consis-
tent with constitutional limitations.
In 1976, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced legislation7"
amending the restrictive language of the APA by bestowing
standing on three classes of "interested persons": any person who
participated in an agency proceeding, citizens, and residents.
This proposal would confer standing on categories of individuals
beyond the existing APA "persons aggrieved" formulation, on the
theory that government caused injury may be intangible but
nonetheless damages society and individuals. Clearly, violations
of law not harming a person directly may nonetheless cause citi-
zens to lose confidence in their government, make them less likely
to vote, and otherwise create cynicism discouraging citizen par-
ticipation in government. Participants in agency proceedings
clearly have a stake in seeking judicial review, because of their
investment in time and money. But the bill also would grant
standing to citizens and residents because governmental action
affects them both directly and indirectly. The bill would establish
a policy that all such persons have a stake in assuring that gov-
ernment officials lawfully conduct operations.s
because such suits clearly violate the judicial function under article III. Id. See also 13
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529 (1975).
77.
In the American system, where even legislative action is subject to judicial
control, there has never been any question of the propriety of judicial review
of agency action. Judicial review is the balance wheel of administrative
law. . . .The responsibility of enforcing the limits of statutory grants of author-
ity is a judicial function . . . . Without judicial review, statutory limits would
be naught but empty words.
B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW 429 (1976).
78. See note 42 supra.
79. S. 3296, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 10427-28 (1976) (died in committee).
80. 122 CONG. REC. S5434 (daily ed. April 12, 1976) ("Commentary on the
'Administrative Procedure Review Act'" submitted by Sen. Kennedy). The scope of this
legislation, being confined to administrative agency action, justifies a grant of standing
to residents as well as citizens. Outside the area of direct agency action, however, only
citizens and not mere residents have a stake in the lawfulness of government action.
Because residents lack such privileges as the ability to petition Congress or to vote, they
lack a sufficient stake in legislation to permit them to challenge the constitutionality of
government enactments. But see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (fourteenth
amendment entitles both resident aliens and citizens of the United States to equal protec-
tion of the laws of the state in which they reside); Bickel, Citizenship in the American
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Such an attempt to liberalize standing law by expanding the
concept of who is entitled to seek judicial review is not likely to
succeed. First, the Court could construe the bill as an attempt to
give standing to those without an injury in fact. The Court might
hold that Congress could no more overturn the Court's articula-
tion of a constitutional definition in this context than it could, for
example, abrogate a criminal defendant's right to counsel. Alter-
natively, the Court might employ a judicial presumption of con-
stitutionality, construing the bill as conferring standing only to
citizens who suffer injury in fact.81 Should the Court make the
first interpretation, this approach would be unconstitutional; but
should the Court make the second interpretation, the intent of
the statute would be defeated. In either view, therefore, judicial
review statutes will have a limited role in liberalizing standing.
D. Citizen Suit Provisions
In addition to judicial review statutes, Congress has enacted
"citizen suit" provisions authorizing citizen enforcement of sub-
stantive legislation.2 These statutes define the class of persons
authorized to bring suit as including the familiar persons ag-
grieved8 or adversely affected,84 and "any interested person" 5 or,
Constitution, 15 Aiuz. L. REV. 369 (1973) (Constitution bestows rights on people and
persons and not merely citizens).
81. A third approach might recognize the compelling similarity between the Data
Processing standing formulation and the Administrative Procedure Act. Arguably, Data
Processing's injury-in-fact requirement need not be based on the Constitution but may
be only a matter of somewhat overly broad statutory construction.
82. Citizen suits, sometimes referred to as citizen enforcement actions, permit en-
forcement against both private parties and governmental entities. See note 86 infra. The
present comment considers only the question of standing against government entities.
83. In addition to the APA, other legislation has taken this approach. For example,
the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1976), provides for judicial
review on appeal for any person "aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected." The
Court interpreted this provision expansively in FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309
U.S. 470 (1940), holding that the legal right test then in effect did not bar a suit by a
competitor radio station that lacked any legal right because Congress's purpose was to
confer standing to those financially injured by the issuance of a license to a competitor.
The statute did not purport to protect economic injury, but the Court permitted litigation
because the plaintiff ultimately was arguing on behalf of the listening public by alleging
that the agency failed to comply with the statutory mandate. Thus, the Court granted
standing to the radio station even though the statute protected the public and not the
station.
The Court broadly enunciated the same principle in Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v.
FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942), and recognized an explicit grant to the radio station to act as a
private attorney general. The Court held that "these private litigants have standing only
as representatives of the public interest." Id. at 14. A recognizable economic injury,
however, was present in the case. Distinguishing the case on this fact, the Court later
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even more liberally, "any person." s Judicial response to the
broadened standing provisions has been inconsistent. A very few
courts interpret article III as denying Congress the power to per-
mit citizen standing where the citizen shows no personal injury,
even assuming the existence of illegal action.8 7 Courts striking
down the citizen suit as incompatible with the case or controversy
limitation fail to see that by creating a substantive right and an
enforcement mechanism, Congress has created a claim "arising
under the Constitution and laws of the United States." Thus,
this approach recognizes constitutional limits and therefore es-
tablishes the requisite right/injury called for by the Supreme
Court.
The better view is that Congress may recruit "private attor-
neys general" to enforce the laws of the land by authorizing citi-
zens to litigate such cases. 89 In this view, nothing precludes Con-
rejected an invitation to apply this approach to the APA provision in Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), where the plaintiff did not allege injury to itself or its
members.
84. The citizen suit provision of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1976), granted standing to persons having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected. Although the Supreme Court has decided a citizen
suit under the act without a comment on the standing question, Train v. Colorado Pub.
Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1 (1976), one federal court denied standing under the
act to a citizen group for lack of a direct and legally protectable interest. Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Train, 71 F.R.D. 391 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
85. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(1)(A) (1976); Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (1976).
86. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1976); Endangered Species
Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1976); Ocean Dumping Act, 33 U.S.C.§ 1415(g)(1) (1976);
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1976); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911
(1976); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305 (1976); Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1976); Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1976). One court read the Endangered Species Act provision to
confer "automatic standing on any person claiming a violation" of the act. National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 400 F. Supp. 705 (D. Miss. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 529
F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
These citizen suit provisions contain extensive guidelines for notice, timeliness, pen-
dency of official action, right of intervention, venue, agency cooperation, consent judg-
ments, and provisions for costs and attorney fees. Such provisions clarify procedures to
provide a predictable framework for litigants.
87. The Ninth Circuit construed the Clean Air Act provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1976),
authorizing suit for any person, to deny standing to an organization that did not show
injury in fact to itself or its members. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,
507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1974). The court said the "inexorable interrelationship between
standing and the constitutional prerequisites of federal jurisdiction under article II"
precluded use of the statute without a showing of injury. Id. at 909.
88. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2.
89. The District of Columbia Circuit, construing the same Clean Air Act provision
considered by the Ninth Circuit, see note 87 supra, permitted a citizen suit without a
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gress from authorizing citizens to assert public causes of action
otherwise permitted only by a government attorney general. The
Supreme Court has declined to use the private attorney general
theory to judicially create standing, 0 but might recognize con-
gressional application of the theory."
Citizen suit statutes rest upon a theoretical rationale similar
to the historic "informer's action" or qui tam action of English
common law." Because qui tam actions ordinarily seek only in-
junctive or declaratory relief, 3 article III should pose no prob-
lems.' Even though citizen enforcement of laws does not conform
showing of injury in fact. Metropolitan Wash. Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Colum-
bia, 511 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The court said that Congress determined any citizen
is a proper party and "[in this way citizens are recruited to serve as private attorneys-
general to facilitate enforcement of the Act in the face of official inaction." Id. at 814 &
n.26. The source of the theory originated in an analysis made by Judge Jerome Frank:
While Congress can constitutionally authorize no one, in the absence of an
actual justiciable controversy, to bring suit for the judicial determination either
of the constitutionality of a statute or the scope of powers conferred by a statute
upon government officers, it can constitutionally authorize one of its own offi-
cials, such as the Attorney General, to bring a proceeding to prevent another
official from acting in violation of his statutory powers; for then an actual
controversy exists, and the Attorney General can properly be vested with au-
thority, in such a controversy, to vindicate the interest of the public or the
government. Instead of designating the Attorney General, or some other public
officer, to bring such proceedings, Congress can constitutionally enact a statute
conferring on any non-official person or on a designated group of non-official
persons, authority to bring suit to prevent action by an officer in violation of
his statutory powers; for then, in like manner, there is an actual controversy,
and there is nothing constitutionally prohibiting Congress from empowering any
person, official or not, to institute a proceeding involving such a controversy,
even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such persons, so
authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals.
Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), dismissed as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
90. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
91.
The Court has confirmed the power of Congress to open the federal courts
to representatives of the public interest through specific statutory grants of
standing. . . . [O1bjections to public actions are ameliorated by the congres-
sional mandate. Specific statutory grants of standing in such cases alleviate the
conditions that make "judicial forbearance the part of wisdom".
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 193, 196 n.18 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)
(quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 132 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
92. "Statutes providing for actions by a common informer, who himself had no inter-
est whatever in the controversy other than that given by statute, have been in existence
for hundreds of years in England, and in this country ever since the foundation of our
Government." Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905) (upholding application of qui
tam action provided in a state antigambling statute).
93. Some informer's actions also permit an award to the informer from the proceeds
of a civil fine. See, e.g., False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-232 (1976).
94. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531,
at 237 (1975).
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to the classic common law action for damages, such litigation
should be understood as presenting a case or controversy because
the citizen enforcing the law is representing the public interest
more than his own interest. A private citizen suit on behalf of the
public or the United States is not intrinsically different from
actions by a public attorney general who need show only a viola-
tion of law and not a personal injury to enforce the law.
In addition to supporting citizen suits in lieu of a public
attorney general suit, the private attorney general theory ana-
lytically provides enforcement mechanisms for any substantive
legislation. The necessary and proper clause provides one basis
for authorizing Congress to appoint citizens to enforce its sub-
stantive legislation. Thus, a citizen suit provision must operate
in tandem with a substantive right. A general citizen suit statute
has been proposed, 5 but without a concomitant substantive
right. A general citizen suit statute would be more effective if
Congress concurrently would create a substantive right to compli-
ance with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
E. Representational Standing
Under present law, a citizen group can gain standing only if
the agency action adversely affects either the group's organiza-
tional operations or the rights of its members.99 For example,
environmental organizations must allege that their members use
the environmental resources that agency actions threaten. Thus,
citizen groups must identify a local "front person" to gain stand-
ing, even though everyone recognizes the litigation tactics are
solely the inspiration and responsibility of the organization. In
environmental disputes, if a concerned group or citizen cannot
readily identify an individual "user," no one can challenge even
the most flagrant violation of law. 7 Actually, an environmental
organization in this situation satisfies the traditional constitu-
tional requirement of adequate presentation of issues in a con-
crete and adversary context." Indeed, an organization with exper-
95. See 40 Fed. Reg. 11,379 (1975) for a proposal made by the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States.
96. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963).
97. "In some environmental situations .. .no one is injured in the Sierra Club v.
Morton sense, as when a deep-sea species protected by the law is threatened with extinc-
tion . . . .[I]n these cases the injury requirement may frustrate fulfillment of the law."
Currie, Judicial Review Under Federal Pollution Laws, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1221 (1977).
98. Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 360 F. Supp. 1057, 1065 (1973), aff'd,
500 F.2d 328 (1974) (interest and expertise of environmental organization assure "that
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tise, funding, and commitment to stated purposes undoubtedly
presents issues more capably than an individual person whose
only obvious injury in the environmental context may be loss of
recreation, physical discomfort, or unknown long-term health ef-
fects. Therefore, public interest organizations should have stand-
ing without engaging in the recognized fiction of identifying
membership representation. Of course, the Supreme Court's im-
position of prudential limitations on the assertion of rights of
third parties has heretofore precluded such a result." Nonethe-
less, the Court has occasionally permitted the assertion of third-
party rights where the third party would have undue difficulty in
representing himself.'0
Representational standing likewise has had its supporters in
Congress. Following the Supreme Court decision in Sierra Club
v. Morton, '0' Senator Phillip Hart introduced legislation to avoid
the Sierra Club result and to grant legal standing not only to
those adversely affected but also to any organization or person
who could "speak knowingly for the environmental values as-
serted in such a suit.' ' °2 This proposed legislation rested upon a
congressional finding that "each person is entitled by right to the
protection and enhancement of environmental quality and that
each person has a responsibility to contribute to the protection
and enhancement of the environment as a trustee for the benefit
of future generations."'0 As with so much other federal environ-
mental legislation, the commerce clause provided the proposal's
constitutional authorization. 04 Although such legislation might
go a long way toward aiding litigants in the environmental con-
text,05 the bill was never reported from committee. Moreover, the
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult .. .questions. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204 (1962).").
99. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
100. See cases cited in United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1960), quoted at
note 28 supra. See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
101. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
102. S. 1104, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 104 (1973).
103. Id. § 102(a).
104. "The Congress further finds and declares that hazards to environmental quality
are caused largely by persons who are engaged in interstate commerce or in activities
which affect interstate commerce." Id. § 102(c).
105. Only 12 states have broad standing provisions which allow citizens to bring suit
to enforce environmental protection legislation; they are collected in Administrative Pro-
cedure Act Amendmemts of 1976: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1976)
(supplemental material prepared by Public Citizen).
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bill did nothing to confer standing to challenge other kinds of
unlawful government action. 06
Another difficulty is that the commerce clause might not as
readily support standing for litigation outside the environmental
context. A proposal by Senator Kennedy would simplify standing
requirements for institutional litigants by amending the APA. 10 7
His bill proposed three criteria for organizational standing: first,
the organization must maintain an office in the United States;
second, its ability to exist or conduct operations must be threat-
ened by the agency action; or third, in lieu of the second, its
organizational purposes must relate to the agency action for
which judicial review is sought.0 8 Contrary to existing law, the
third criterion was once espoused by a number of courts. 109 Al-
though somewhat unclear, the constitutional rationale of this pro-
posal derived from congressional power to modify the Court's
prudential standing requirements. 0 Since 1976, however, the
Court appears to have rested its new standing rules on a constitu-
tional foundation. Therefore, this kind of proposed legislation
might be better predicated upon congressional authority to pro-
vide for judicial review of administrative action or to regulate
procedure of the lower federal courts.
Another proposal for representational standing would rest
upon the assertion of third-party rights, which analytically have
been prudential limits on judicial review. Professor Sedler sug-
gests that "where the rights of members of a class are affected
because of their membership in that class, an organization which
has as a purpose the protection of the interests of the class...
should have standing to assert the rights of the class members.""
106. Professor Albert contends:
The interests of consumers and environmentalists, while held in common with
many, are plainly not equivalent to a citizen's interest in good government. To
the contrary, such interests going to matters that affect the quality of life,
leisure, and health, are as tangible and palpable as the typical fare for adjudica-
tion.
Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim
for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 489 (1974). Nevertheless, the theoretical justifications for
public actions do not support his conclusion. See note 132 infra.
107. See S. 3296, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 10427-28 (1976).
108. Id. § 103(b).
109. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 615-16 (2d Cir. 1965). The
Supreme Court expressly rejected the concept in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739
(1972).
110. See 122 CONG. REC. 10430, 10433 (1976) ("Commentary on the Administrative
Procedure'Review Act of 1976," exhibit to remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
111. Sedler, supra note 56, at 881.
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Examples would be suits by the NAACP challenging racial dis-
crimination or by an organization representing the indigent chal-
lenging discrimination against the poor."' Sedler believes that
because the interest asserted is a group interest, at least some
members of the group will have suffered injury in fact from the
challenged action and, consequently, there should be no constitu-




A sixth major change in federal standing law could be
achieved by allowing federal taxpayers to challenge the legality
of federal expenditures. Senator Kennedy's 1976 standing reform
legislation would have permitted taxpayer standing."' Unfortu-
nately, Metzenbaum's proposed Citizens Right to Standing in
Federal Courts Act expressly declines to modify standing law for
taxpayers. ,,5
Because taxpayer precedents support restrictive standing
barriers, such a provision is an essential component of any stand-
ing reform."' Moreover, citizen complaints of unlawful govern-
ment activity often are combined factually with issues of revenue
expenditures. A statutory grant of taxpayer standing could clarify
the law in an important area and bring federal practice into con-
formity with the great weight of American taxpayer standing doc-
trine.""
The theoretical rationale to support a congressional grant of
standing to taxpayers would be the same as for any modification
112. Id.
113. Id. Professor Sedler concedes that the injury-in-fact hurdle itself as imposed by
Data Processing and Eastern Kentucky could not be overcome by representational stand-
ing without citizen standing as well.
114. S. 3296, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201, 122 CONG. REC. 10427-28 (1976).
115. "This section shall not affect the standing or lack of standing of persons to sue
as taxpayers .. . ." S. 680, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 125 CONG. REc. 52822 (daily ed.
March 15, 1979).
116. The vitality of the restrictive rule denying taxpayer standing originating in
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), is shown by its modern use in cases such as
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). Likewise, the Court has cited the other
major taxpayer case, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), in virtually every standing case
since, even where taxpayer standing was not in issue.
117. Nearly every state has authorized taxpayer suits for state taxpayers. See
"Taxpayer Standing: Survey of State Laws" in State of the Judiciary and Access to
Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 301-02 app. (1977).
See also note 119 infra.
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affecting prudential requirements."' The justification rests upon
a recognition that taxpayers are more likely to attack potentially
invalid legislation or government practices than are state or fed-
eral officials, and that individual citizen-taxpayers may take a
more active role in their government by this means."'
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Each of the six approaches discussed above illustrates that
Congress is not barred from effecting drastic changes in the law
of standing. Even if the Court is wrong in denominating standing
requirements as constitutional, Congress cannot simply say it
disagrees with the Court's interpretation and establish its own
criteria. The Metzenbaum proposal is clearly violative of the
Supreme Court's current formulation and, therefore, may not
withstand constitutional attack. Although one element, the zone
of interest test, may be upheld as modifying only a prudential
barrier, the other barriers, rooted in constitutional doctrine, can-
not be eliminated summarily. To establish the most coherent
reform, Congress should implement a combination of approaches
based on sound constitutional theory. The following three-tiered
recommendation will integrate these approaches most effectively.
Congress should: (1) establish a substantive right that govern-
ment officials comply with the laws and Constitution of the
United States; (2) provide for enforcement of that substantive
right by citizens and taxpayers, as well as organizations repre-
senting them; and (3) provide for systematic means of judicial
review.
These three provisions, operating in tandem, establish a
comprehensive outline for standing and would supersede judi-
cially created prudential requirements and the varying provisions
of citizen suit statutes. 0 The substantive right is necessary as the
118. See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
119. Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 334 N.E.2d 579, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1975)
(judicial grant of standing to state taxpayers) (limited by Wein v. Comptroller, 46 N.Y.2d
394, 386 N.E.2d 244, 413 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1979) (no standing to challenge state revenue
raising procedures as distingushed from expenditures under statute enacted subsequent
to Boryszewski)).
120. "Where the [legislature] has codified the law on a subject, such statutory
provisions are to govern to the exclusion of prior nonstatutory law unless there is a clear
legislative intention expressed or necessarily implied that the statutory provisions are
merely cumulative." Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 197, 58 N.E.2d 381,
384 (1944). Rather than creating a plethora of possibly conflicting guidelines, see note 86
supra, a more general citizen suit statute would standardize the procedural incidents for
citizen enforcement actions. The policy questions of the scope of such provisions is beyond
19791
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bedrock foundation for standing reform. By providing in essence
a right and a remedy for a public wrong, Congress would be acting
within its constitutional authority. Then, by providing for en-
forcement and judicial review, based in part on the private attor-
ney general theory and in part on a simple recognition that pri-
vate parties can enforce the legislative right created, citizens will
once again have access to the courts to prevent government ille-
galities. The tripartite system of government can operate for the
protection and welfare of the people only if people are permitted
to communicate fully with each branch of government.
This recommendation accomplishes three things. First, it
explicitly identifies the injury triggering standing, thus meeting
the constitutional rules governing generalized grievances, causa-
tion, redressability, and injury in fact. Second, it identifies citi-
zens and taxpayers as appropriate plaintiffs to challenge unlawful
government action.' Third, it provides a comprehensive, statu-
tory outline of standing requisites, thus superseding judicially
created prudential rules.
2
the scope of this comment, but it should be noted that there may be some controversy
concerning such requirements. See J. Duarte, Memorandum on Public Comments on
Mashaw Report and Recommendations (April 16, 1975) (unpublished memorandum on
file with the Administrative Conference of the United States). Moreover, there may be
some wisdom in retaining flexible and individual approaches in specific statutory provi-
sions which currently exist. There may be no substantial reason, for example, to have the
same notice requirements for pollution as compared to consumer fraud.
121. Cf. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688 ("To deny standing to persons who are in fact
injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious
and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody.").
The Court came to the opposite conclusion only a year later:
It can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate this issue, no one
can do so. In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class
to litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is
committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political pro-
cess . . . . Lack of standing within the narrow confines of Art. III jurisdiction
does not impair the right to assert his views in the political forum or at the polls.
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
This referral to the political system for redress is unjustified in the absence of a clearly
political question. A grievance may be generalized but not actually be a political question,
as where Congress has enacted an unconstitutional statute or where an administrative
agency acts beyond its authority. If safeguarding constitutional values and enforcing the
laws of the land is the special function of the judiciary, particularized personal interests
that are a prerequisite in private litigation are inappropriate where the government is the
defendant. While the political system undeniably is the forum for resolving policy issues,
where the dispute is over constitutional or legal limitations only a judicial forum is
appropriate. The line between a political question and a generalized grievance may at
times be a thin one, but it is one which must be drawn.
122. But see note 120 supra.
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V. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROPOSED STANDING REFORM
Congress has abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity
as a bar to judicial review of federal administrative action be-
cause the notion that the king can do no wrong is clearly out of
place in a modern democracy based on law. 23 Likewise, standing
is an unacceptable way to defend unlawful government action.
Restrictive standing rules are justified only if one accepts the
proposition that citizens have insufficient interest in their govern-
ment's actions to obtain any test of the legality of those actions.
Citizens and citizen groups have a stake in assuring that govern-
ment officials conduct operations lawfully because ultimately the
only proper function of government in the United States is to
serve the citizenry. 24
Legislative reform is greatly needed to clarify the confusing
law of standing. The findings of the Metzenbaum bill recognize
the needs to redress public injuries, resolve the uncertainty of
present standing rules, and avoid wasting time on technical
threshold standing questions. 25 There are additional policy justi-
fications for congressional reform giving citizens standing to chal-
123. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976).
124. "In our country the people are sovereign and the Government cannot sever its
relationship to the people by taking away their citizenship." Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S.
253, 257 (1967).
125. The bill provides:
SEC. 2. The congress finds and declares that-
(a) the ability of members of the public to have access to the Federal Courts to
obtain redress for unlawful governmental action is essential to the democratic
process, both to enable members of the public to protect their own interests and
to allow redress of injuries that affect many members of the public in relatively
equal measure;
(b) substantial uncertainty surrounds the specific requisites for standing to sue
in the Federal courts, forcing both the courts and individual litigants to devote
inordinate amounts of their resources to this issue;
(c) unduly restrictive standing requirements have prevented the prompt resolu-
tion of meritorious lawsuits, and have resulted in the dismissal of complaints
alleging serious violations of the Constitution and laws of the United States
without consideration of their merits, even where plaintiffs have shown injuries
sufficient to enable adequate presentation of relevant issues in a concrete and
adversary context;
(d) it is a more efficient and productive use of limited judicial resources to reach
prompt resolution of meritorious lawsuits alleging violations of the Constitution
and laws of the United States by officers and agencies of Government rather
than utilizing those resources for the interpretation of unduly restrictive or
complex nonconstitutional standing requirements.
S. 3005, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CoNG. REc. S6498 (daily ed. April 27, 1978). These
declarations are embodied in the findings and policy of the statute, not in its substantive
terms.
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lenge unlawful government action. Such reform (1) recognizes
that citizen interest in good government includes interest in law-
ful government,'26 (2) improves judicial access to check abuses of
regulatory agencies,' 7 (3) eliminates inconsistencies in existing
citizen suit statutes by providing a uniform framework for all
citizen suits,'1 (4) encourages enforcement of the public interest
as viewed from unofficial perspectives, 2 (5) provides added en-
forcement at little cost to the public treasury, ,30 (6) stimulates the
productivity of public enforcers,' 3' (7) allows citizens to assume
part of the responsibility for effective operation of government,
32
(8) helps prevent government illegalities from going uncor-
rected,' 33 and, finally, (9) gives all government officials incentive
to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States.'
34
A statutory change in the law of standing will not, however,
remove valid measures protecting judicial resources from misuse.
The traditional safeguards of mootness, ripeness, political ques-
tion, and advisory opinions will remain intact.'3 5 Judicial defer-
ence to administrative expertise will continue.' 3 Further, experi-
126. "The role of the judiciary is integral to the doctrine of separation of powers. It
is unacceptable now by any process of continued quarantine to exclude the very persons
most likely to invoke its powers." Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 364, 334 N.E.2d
579, 581, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626 (1975).
127. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 77, at 429.
128. But see note 120 supra.
129. J. Mashaw, Report to the Committee on Compliance and Enforcement Proceed-
ings-Private Enforcement of Public Regulatory Provisions: The "Citizens Suit" (Jan. 8,




132. "First, such suits augment the enforcement efforts of Federal officials. Second,
they allow citizens to assume part of the responsibility for the effective operation of their
government. . . . The legislation recognizes that citizen access to the Federal courts to
redress unlawful governmental action is essential to the democratic process." 124 CONG.
REc. S6498 (daily ed. April 27, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum).




The way to protect against too much government by judges is to limit what the
judges decide, not to limit who can raise a question for the court to decide. . ...
The appropriate tools are the law[s] of unreviewability and . . . scope of re-
view, not . . . standing. . . . The law of "political question" is a much better
judicial tool than the law of standing for deciding what the court should decide.
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.21, at 522-23 (1976) (supplementing
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1958)).
136. "This court is not at liberty to substitute its own discretion for that of adminis-
trative officers who have kept within the bounds of their administrative powers." Ameri-
can Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 236 (1936).
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ence under existing citizen suit statutes and state statutes relax-
ing standing barriers has shown that the expense and burden of
litigation limits the filing of frivolous suits.' In any given case,
plaintiffs must still state a reasonable cause of action. Thus,
while reform will lower standing barriers, appropriate constraints
on judicial processes will remain intact.'
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of the law of standing to sue is neither to serve
judicial economy, nor to help courts avoid consideration of claims
they prefer not to hear, nor even to sharpen the presentation of
issues. Although the courts have used standing to achieve these
ends, the true purpose of standing is simply to determine whether
a particular plaintiff is entitled to invoke judicial processes. Citi-
zens are proper litigants wherever a government spending pro-
gram or operation threatens their welfare, even if the activity is
indirect, shared by many, and the court's remedy will be only one
step toward accomplishing a larger social objective. By its perva-
sive nature, unlawful government action can create injury.'39 Con-
gress must insist the courts recognize that government officials
are just as capable of breaking the law as any other person and
that citizens and citizens groups have a right to challenge such
illegal conduct.
Congress should act swiftly to enact remedial standing legis-
lation, but it should also adopt the most effective measure possi-
ble. Because of serious doubts concerning the constitutionality
and effectiveness of Senator Metzenbaum's Citizens Right to
Standing in Federal Courts Act, Congress should adopt a more
positive and comprehensive approach removing technical stand-
ing barriers for citizen enforcement actions and providing a clear
exposition of the citizens' right to seek judicial review of unlawful
government action.
Harold W Wood, Jr.
137. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1006 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (economic reality will limit the number of plaintiffs resulting from
expansion of standing criteria).
138. See generally Administrative Procedure Act Amendments of 1976: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1976) (supplemental material prepared by Public Citi-
zen).
139. "Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its
own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
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